5 Things You Might Not Know About Ed Bellis

8 09 2009

Before you roll your eyes in disdain that this blog is perpetuating a meme equivalent of a chain mail, please understand I am posting this purely out of fear and self-preservation. After being “tagged” for this duty I expressed my concerns in participating via Twitter and received the following response from Erin Jacobs:

Screen shot

So… in an effort to control “my version of the truth”, as much as I don’t care to expose things not known about me (after all they are not known for a reason), here I go.

1. I have a FULL HOUSE. No, I’m not talking about poker. Literally, I’m married with 3 kids ages 6 and under, I have a dog, a cat and even fish (technically the fish is my daughters).

2. I come from a lineage of professional and semi-professional baseball players. I have had relatives who have played in both minor and major league baseball including my grandfather who pitched for a season with the Boston Red Sox and played with Ted Williams. I also played on the same baseball team in summer leagues with someone who eventually made it to the majors.

3. Speaking of lineage, I am #4 in a lineup of 5. I’ll let you figure that one out.

4. My first computer was an Atari 400 with a membrane keyboard and a whopping 4KB of RAM. My first two cartridges were Basic and Assembler. Later I added a modem and cassette drive. I was 9 years old, you do the math.

5. SHAMELESS PLUG: In an effort to hijack most public things I do these days, I have (along with @rybolov) become an un-official evangelist for SCAP. Do me a favor and go check it out.

As part of this meme, I am now required to tag 5 additional people because that’s how these things work I guess (smell the enthusiasm?). So my apologies to: Mike (@rybolov) Smith, Ben (@falconsview) Tomhave, Trey (@treyford) Ford, Alex (@alexhutton) Hutton, and Dan (@danphilpott) Philpott.





BlackHat Without The Drama

4 08 2009

Well another BlackHat is in the books and another round of vulnerabilities have been disclosed and bantered about. I was fortunate enough to be able to attend this year as a panelist on the Laws of Vulnerabilities 2.0 discussion. While I was happy and honored to be invited, I wanted to draw some attention to another talk.

No, I’m not talking about the SSL issues presented by Dan Kaminsky or Moxie Marlinspike. Nor am I referring to the mobile SMS exploits. Each year you can count on BlackHat and Defcon for presentations and displays in lots of interesting security research and incredibly sexy vulnerabilities and exploits. Every year attendees walk away with that sinking feeling that the end of the internet is nigh and we have little hope of diverting it’s destruction. But, despite this, we have not shut down the internet and we manage to continue to chug along and develop new applications and infrastructure on top of it.

I was able to attend a session on Thursday that explained and theorized about why this all works out the way it does. It was the final session of the conference and unfortunately was opposite Bruce Schneier, which meant a lot of people that should have seen this, didn’t. Of course, Bruce is a great speaker and I’m sure I missed out as well, but hey that’s what the video is for.

David Mortman and Alex Hutton presented a risk management session on BlackHat vulnerabilities and ran them through the “Mortman/Hutton” risk model – clever name indeed. They included a couple of real-world practitioners and ran through how these newly disclosed vulnerabilities may or may not affect us over the coming weeks and months. They were able to quantify why some vulnerabilities have a greater affect and at what point in time they reach a tipping point where a majority of users of a given technology should address.

David and Alex are regular writers on the New School of Information Security blog and will be posting their model in full with hopes of continuing to debate, evolve and improve it. Any of these new security vulnerabilities concern you? Go check out the model and see where they stand.

Note: This post was originally published on CSO Online.





I Dream of Federation

15 07 2009

…And so does @rybolov. I don’t often do this, but the latest post on the Guerilla CISO blog is worth a re-post. Go check it out here. I have been talking about this a lot lately. SCAP is still coming into its own but has a lot of promise in helping security teams automate much of the vulnerability management and patching pains they experience today.

Of course we’ll be watching these guys closely as well. =)





Places to go, People to see

8 07 2009
*image courtesy of Roadsidepictures

*image courtesy of Roadsidepictures

Quick schedule update: Looking forward to both of these events. Let me know if you’ll be at either and want to chat. Looking to fill my schedule up for these events.

Black Hat – Las Vegas: Invited to participate on a panel to discuss the Laws of Vulnerability Research 2.0. Here’s a link to the summary. Register here.

Metricon 4.0: This should be a really good event. The full agenda is published here. I will be discussing the use of the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) and the metrics being produced from this new view into the data. You can request participation via email here.

Hope to see you there!





Crowdsourcing Payment Security

30 06 2009

In my inaugural post to this blog, I wrote about many of the religious wars that break out today regarding payment security and specifically PCI. In the post I mentioned the OWASP PCI project, which is a solid step in the right direction, but to be clear, payment security encompasses a lot more than just PCI. PCI does a decent job at setting an audit bar for merchants and service providers, but now I’d like to focus on the broader topic of card not present security.

Recently, I was lucky enough to participate and contribute to a new O’Reilly book, Beautiful Security. While I’d love to tell you my chapter out-shined them all, in reality Mark Curphey’s contribution on Tomorrow’s Security Cogs and Levers was brilliant. Since the publishing, I have been speaking to a lot of people on the topic of payment card security and what I felt were some of its fundamental flaws that needed to be addressed. In my view, the root cause of many of the security pains around online payments is the reliance on a shared secret that is ultimately shared with hundreds or even thousands of parties within the life of a card. If there is a security crack in the armor within even a single organization of these thousands of handlers, the card account may become breached. Within my chapter, I laid out seven fundamental requirements for a new payment security model. They are:

1. The consumer must be authenticated
2. The merchant must be authenticated
3. The transaction must be authorized
4. Authentication data should not be shared outside of authenticator and authenticatee
5. The process must not rely solely on shared secrets
6. Authentication should be portable
7. The confidentiality and integrity of data and transactions must be maintained

OK, so none of these are a revelation, you knew this already. Well that’s why I am posting this here. I have since converted my Beautiful Security contribution into a wiki found here. My original writing is a high level design and we now want to take this to the next step. I am certainly not foolish enough to believe there are no flaws within it, nor is it detailed enough yet to implement. This is where the security and payments folks come in. This a call to action to read through the wiki, update it, and begin to flash out the details that could turn this into an actionable payment security system that could be implemented. There’s a quick summary of the goals on the wiki home page to address where we are heading. But hey, this is a wiki, so those can change too! If you have some expertise in online payments or information security (I know you do, that’s why you’re here), please take the time to help out and contribute.

Note: This post originally published on CSO Online.





OpenID Publishes Security Best Practices

17 06 2009

A set of security best practices were recently published via wiki for users, providers, and relying parties of OpenID. Someone had recently asked me about a specific application that sits on top of OpenID and what I had thought of the security behind it. In the process of digging through it, I came across this newly developed Security Best Practices wiki.

Let me first apologize to my friend for getting a bit side-tracked off of his original question, but having written about OpenID about a year and a half ago, I felt the need to go through this and find out if any of the original concerns I had expressed had been addressed.

After going through the wiki, it’s mainly common sense security controls you would expect organized by audience for end users, OpenID providers and relying parties. That said, one thing really struck my eye:

“Relying Parties should not use OpenID Assertions to authorize transactions of monetary value if the assertion contains a PAPE message indicating that the user authenticated with Assurance Level NIST Level 0.”

This is big. Did I overlook these assurance levels contained within PAPE messages last year? I essentially had two gripes about OpenID, one being there are a lot of OpenID providers but not nearly enough relying parties (this is still the case IMHO), and two; setting up a relying party required you trust the authentication levels of the OpenID providers. While authentication control details are not revealed to the relying party (this is probably a good thing), this gives the relying party some level of assurance and the ability to pick and choose which OpenID providers they trust  to authenticate their users. I had previously complained that any site falling within a scope of a number of regulations wouldn’t really have the option of becoming a relying party, this may change that. As an example, if my application requires two factor authentication, as a relying party I know at a minimum the PAPE message must contain an Assurance Level of 3 or higher to meet my criteria. Here’s a link with more details to the various NIST assurance levels.

What do you think? Does this make OpenID more viable beyond the social media sites? Why? Why not?

UPDATE: Originally posted on CSOonline.





Our Need For Security Intelligence

8 06 2009

No I am not speaking of military intelligence, but rather, business intelligence within a security context. Business intelligence and decision support systems have now been widely used by many of our counterparts within our organizations to obtain a better view of reality and in turn make better decisions based on that reality. These decision support systems have been helping teams throughout our companies in identifying areas of poor product performance, highlighting areas of current and potential future demand, key performance indicators, etc. We in the information security field need to learn from our business counterparts in taking advantage of some of the existing underlying technology within this space to make better security decisions.

While many of the tools and technology already exist, much of the data sadly does not. This has been a common complaint of security practitioners who have examined this space. This fact, however, should not prevent us from doing anything. There is still data out there we are all sitting on today waiting to be culled and mined.

From books such as The New School of Information Security and Security Metrics, we know there are a lot of areas we could be measuring within information security to allow us to make better decisions. A simple example might lie within enterprise vulnerability management.

Where are the sources?

Certainly the data isn’t a panacea (at the publicly available and open shared data) , but there is enough of it out there that we can improve some of our decision making. There are a number of vulnerability data sources companies can leverage to aggregate this information in a meaningful way beginning of course with it’s own internal vulnerability data across its known hosts, networks, and applications. Add to the mix relevant configuration and asset management data and publicly available sources and subscription services. Some of this information can be bucketed by industry as well.

Sprinkle in some threat data.

So it’s one thing to understand your vulnerable state, but that doesn’t really give us a clear picture on any sort of likelihood, probability or risk of compromise. We also need to understand what some of our threats are. Unfortunately, this set of data isn’t as clear. There are some sources we can begin to pull information from in order to overlay some basic decision support. These include, Honeynet and honeypot sources, public databases such as datalossdb and malwaredb, threat clearinghouses (currently not fully available to the public), publications such as the Verizon DBIR, and so on. To quote the New School, “breach data is not actuarial data”, but combined with some intelligence it can add a small level of priority. Imagine feeding real-time honeynet data into your BI systems.

…And start tying it to your business.

This space is clearly in it’s infancy and we have a long way to go, but I like many others, believe this is a discipline we must take up if we are to begin making more credible and rational decisions within information security. Using the data discussed, we can begin to tie in some of the sources the other parts of the business are already using readily to understand values of various transactions. This gives us at least a high level of what’s important and where we may be able to focus some near term effort. If we analyze the industry data, we may be able to understand whether we are a ‘target of choice’ or a ‘target of opportunity’, which may play into the level of effort to remediate a given bug and whether to invest more or less in detective controls. We can use clickstream from our web analytics tools to detect fraudulent behavior or business logic flaws within our web applications. Companies like SilverTail Systems are already taking advantage of this type of information.

As we get higher quality data, we can make decisions that help us align with the risk appetite of the business by measuring the difference between current state and targets. Then envision, as Mark Curphey speaks of, using Business Process Management tools to automate the remediation workflow. There all kinds of places this information can take us, but we have to start using what we have and not just sit around hoping for a day of “better data”.

Note: Originally posted on CSOonline.com





New Blog Up!

26 05 2009

Apologies for the cross-post, but here’s a quick link to my inaugural blog post on CSO Online, discussing issues around payment security and how you can help! You can subscribe to the new blog via RSS here. This won’t completely replace this blog but rather supplement it. :-)





Beautiful Security

29 04 2009

Just a quick post to let you know Beautiful Security from O’Reilly is now available at Amazon as well as directly from O’Reilly. Chapter Five – Beautiful Trade: Rethinking Ecommerce, is my personal favorite, but I may be a little biased :-) .

All author proceeds will be donated to charity, so buy an extra copy for the kids!

/shameless self-promo





Streaming Announcements

30 03 2009

Well March has been a BUSY month but I just wanted to post a bit of info out here about what’s been going on and what’s coming up.

First off thanks to David Campbell, Kathy Thaxton and Eric Duprey for inviting me out to SnowFROC in Denver! I had a great time and just like last year, there was a lot of interesting talks on Web Application Security. Also thanks, to Bill Brenner and Lafe Low at CxO Media, for getting me involved in their CSO Data Loss Prevention seminar in Chicago. You can find the lineup of presentations with video for SnowFROC posted here and the CSO Seminar presentations posted here. Bill Brenner wrote a good piece on my presentation here.

Today I had the pleasure of participating in a lunch time podcast for the Society of Payment Security Professionals (SPSP) with Michael Dahn and Anton Chuvakin. We talked about the current and possible future state of payment security, how or if risk management plays into this as well as the “security first” vs. “compliance first” mindset. Thanks to Michael Dahn for having me on. I will update this post with a link to the podcast once it’s up.

For those of you not aware, I also serve on the Board of Advisors to the SPSP and work with Trey Ford and others on their Application Security Working Group. You should check out more about them here and reach out to me if you’re interested in participating in the AppSec Working Group. The Working Group is currently working on a DRAFT Playbook for PCI 6.6 Requirements. Get involved.

Bill Brenner over at CSO online has also been so kind as to let me participate on the CSO Online blogs section of the site. That should give me more motivation to post more often. Warning – I may end up double posting at times here or linking directly to the new CSO blog.

Thanks to the guys over at Matasano Security for putting on a great TechTalk at Orbitz. Thomas Ptacek and Mike Tracey came on site to give their 7 Deadly Features of Web Applications to a good crowd. A good presentation covered by a couple of very smart guys. If I am able to get both internal and Matasano approval, I may post the video of the presentation here later.

I’m a little late on the news here but both the BSIMM (Building Security In Maturity Model) as well as OpenSAMM (Open Software Assurance Maturity Model) have been released. The latter is now an OWASP project. I am just now getting around to reading through these and hope to have some thoughts put around this topic soon.

Finally, I am scheduled to speak at the next OWASP Chicago chapter meeting, pulling out my SnowFROC presentation for those who were not able to come out. The Chicago OWASP meeting is tentatively scheduled for April 29th. You can subscribe to the OWASP Chicago mailing list here if you don’t already do so.